

Approx-SVP in Ideal lattices with Pre-Processing

Alice Pellet-Mary, Guillaume Hanrot and Damien Stehlé

LIP, ENS de Lyon (France)


tMeet seminar at IIT Madras,
October 30, 2018




European Research Council
Established by the European Commission

What is this talk about


Time/Approximation factor trade-off for SVP in ideal lattices:



BKZ algorithm




[CDPR16, CDW17]



This work
(with $2^{O(n)}$ pre-processing)


Lattices



Lattice

A lattice L is a discrete 'vector space' over \mathbb{Z} .

Lattices




Lattice

A lattice L is a discrete 'vector space' over \mathbb{Z} .

A basis of L is an invertible matrix B such that $L = \{Bx \mid x \in \mathbb{Z}^n\}$.

$\begin{pmatrix} 3 & 1 \\ 0 & 2 \end{pmatrix}$ and $\begin{pmatrix} 17 & 11 \\ 4 & 2 \end{pmatrix}$ are two bases of the above lattice.


Lattices



Shortest Vector Problem (SVP)

Find a shortest (in Euclidean norm) non-zero vector.
Its Euclidean norm is denoted λ_1 .


Lattices



Approximate Shortest Vector Problem (approx-SVP)

Find a short (in Euclidean norm) non-zero vector.
(e.g. of norm $\leq 2\lambda_1$).


Lattices



Closest Vector Problem (CVP)

Given a target point t , find a point of the lattice closest to t .

Lattices



Approximate Closest Vector Problem (approx-CVP)

Given a target point t , find a point of the lattice close to t .

Complexity of SVP/CVP

Applications


SVP and CVP in general lattices are conjectured to be hard to solve both quantumly and classically \Rightarrow used in cryptography

Complexity of SVP/CVP

Applications

SVP and CVP in general lattices are conjectured to be hard to solve both quantumly and classically \Rightarrow used in cryptography

Best Time/Approximation trade-off for general lattices: BKZ algorithm



Structured lattices

Improve efficiency of lattice-based crypto using structured lattices, e.g.

$$M = \begin{pmatrix} a_1 & a_2 & \cdots & a_n \\ -a_n & a_1 & \cdots & a_{n-1} \\ \vdots & \ddots & \ddots & \vdots \\ -a_2 & -a_3 & \cdots & a_1 \end{pmatrix}$$

Structured lattices

Improve efficiency of lattice-based crypto using structured lattices, e.g.

$$M = \begin{pmatrix} a_1 & a_2 & \cdots & a_n \\ -a_n & a_1 & \cdots & a_{n-1} \\ \vdots & \ddots & \ddots & \vdots \\ -a_2 & -a_3 & \cdots & a_1 \end{pmatrix}$$

⇒ this is an ideal lattice

Structured lattices

Improve efficiency of lattice-based crypto using structured lattices, e.g.


$$M = \begin{pmatrix} a_1 & a_2 & \cdots & a_n \\ -a_n & a_1 & \cdots & a_{n-1} \\ \vdots & \ddots & \ddots & \vdots \\ -a_2 & -a_3 & \cdots & a_1 \end{pmatrix}$$

⇒ this is an ideal lattice

Is approx-SVP still hard when restricted to ideal lattices?

SVP in ideal lattices

[CDPR16,CDW17]: Better than BKZ in the quantum setting




- Heuristic
- For prime power cyclotomic fields

[CDPR16] R. Cramer, L. Ducas, C. Peikert and O. Regev. Recovering Short Generators of Principal Ideals in Cyclotomic Rings, Eurocrypt.

[CDW17] R. Cramer, L. Ducas, B. Wesolowski. Short Stickelberger Class Relations and Application to Ideal-SVP, Eurocrypt.

This work



- Heuristic
- Pre-processing $2^{O(n)}$, independent of the choice of the ideal (non-uniform algorithm).

Outline of the talk

- 1 Definitions and objective
- 2 The CDPR algorithm
- 3 This work
- 4 Extensions and conclusion

First definitions

Notation

$$R = \mathbb{Z}[X]/(X^n + 1) \text{ for } n = 2^k$$

First definitions

Notation

$$R = \mathbb{Z}[X]/(X^n + 1) \text{ for } n = 2^k$$

- Units: $R^\times = \{a \in R \mid \exists b \in R, ab = 1\}$
 - ▶ e.g. $\mathbb{Z}^\times = \{-1, 1\}$

First definitions

Notation

$$R = \mathbb{Z}[X]/(X^n + 1) \text{ for } n = 2^k$$


- Units: $R^\times = \{a \in R \mid \exists b \in R, ab = 1\}$
 - ▶ e.g. $\mathbb{Z}^\times = \{-1, 1\}$
- Principal ideals: $\langle g \rangle = \{gr \mid r \in R\}$ (i.e. all multiples of g)
 - ▶ e.g. $\langle 2 \rangle = \{\text{even numbers}\}$ in \mathbb{Z}
 - ▶ g is called a generator of $\langle g \rangle$
 - ▶ The generators of $\langle g \rangle$ are exactly the ug for $u \in R^\times$

Why is $\langle g \rangle$ a lattice?

$$R \simeq \mathbb{Z}^n$$

$$R = \mathbb{Z}[X]/(X^n + 1) \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}^n$$

$$r = r_0 + r_1X + \cdots + r_{n-1}X^{n-1} \mapsto (r_0, r_1, \dots, r_{n-1})$$




Why is $\langle g \rangle$ a lattice?

$$R \simeq \mathbb{Z}^n$$

$$R = \mathbb{Z}[X]/(X^n + 1) \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}^n$$

$$r = r_0 + r_1X + \cdots + r_{n-1}X^{n-1} \mapsto (r_0, r_1, \dots, r_{n-1})$$

$$\begin{cases} \langle g \rangle \subseteq R \simeq \mathbb{Z}^n \\ \text{stable by '+' and '-'} \end{cases} \Rightarrow \text{lattice}$$



Why is $\langle g \rangle$ a lattice?

$$R \simeq \mathbb{Z}^n$$

$$R = \mathbb{Z}[X]/(X^n + 1) \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}^n$$

$$r = r_0 + r_1X + \cdots + r_{n-1}X^{n-1} \mapsto (r_0, r_1, \dots, r_{n-1})$$

$$\begin{cases} \langle g \rangle \subseteq R \simeq \mathbb{Z}^n \\ \text{stable by '+' and '-'} \end{cases} \Rightarrow \text{lattice}$$

Basis: $g, gX, gX^2, \dots, gX^{n-1}$

Why is $\langle g \rangle$ a lattice?

$$R \simeq \mathbb{Z}^n$$

$$R = \mathbb{Z}[X]/(X^n + 1) \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}^n$$

$$r = r_0 + r_1X + \cdots + r_{n-1}X^{n-1} \mapsto (r_0, r_1, \dots, r_{n-1})$$

$$\begin{cases} \langle g \rangle \subseteq R \simeq \mathbb{Z}^n \\ \text{stable by '+' and '-'} \end{cases} \Rightarrow \text{lattice}$$

Basis: $g, gX, gX^2, \dots, gX^{n-1}$

$$\text{i.e., } \begin{pmatrix} g_0 \\ g_1 \\ \vdots \\ g_{n-1} \end{pmatrix}$$

Why is $\langle g \rangle$ a lattice?

$$R \simeq \mathbb{Z}^n$$

$$R = \mathbb{Z}[X]/(X^n + 1) \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}^n$$

$$r = r_0 + r_1X + \cdots + r_{n-1}X^{n-1} \mapsto (r_0, r_1, \dots, r_{n-1})$$

$$\begin{cases} \langle g \rangle \subseteq R \simeq \mathbb{Z}^n \\ \text{stable by '+' and '-'} \end{cases} \Rightarrow \text{lattice}$$

Basis: $g, gX, gX^2, \dots, gX^{n-1}$

$$\text{i.e., } \begin{pmatrix} g_0 & -g_{n-1} \\ g_1 & g_0 \\ \vdots & \vdots \\ g_{n-1} & g_{n-2} \end{pmatrix}$$

Why is $\langle g \rangle$ a lattice?

$$R \simeq \mathbb{Z}^n$$

$$R = \mathbb{Z}[X]/(X^n + 1) \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}^n$$
$$r = r_0 + r_1X + \cdots + r_{n-1}X^{n-1} \mapsto (r_0, r_1, \dots, r_{n-1})$$

$$\begin{cases} \langle g \rangle \subseteq R \simeq \mathbb{Z}^n \\ \text{stable by '+' and '-'} \end{cases} \Rightarrow \text{lattice}$$

Basis: $g, gX, gX^2, \dots, gX^{n-1}$

$$\text{i.e., } \begin{pmatrix} g_0 & -g_{n-1} & \cdots & -g_1 \\ g_1 & g_0 & \cdots & -g_2 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ g_{n-1} & g_{n-2} & \cdots & g_0 \end{pmatrix}$$

Objective of this talk

Objective

Given a basis of a principal ideal $\langle g \rangle$ and $\alpha \in (0, 1]$,

Find $r \in \langle g \rangle$ such that $\|r\| \leq 2^{\tilde{O}(n^\alpha)} \cdot \lambda_1$.


Objective of this talk

Objective

Given a basis of a principal ideal $\langle g \rangle$ and $\alpha \in (0, 1]$,

Find $r \in \langle g \rangle$ such that $\|r\| \leq 2^{\tilde{O}(n^\alpha)} \cdot \lambda_1$.

BKZ algorithm can do it in time $2^{O(n^{1-\alpha})}$, can we do better?



Outline of the talk

- 1 Definitions and objective
- 2 The CDPR algorithm**
- 3 This work
- 4 Extensions and conclusion

Main idea of the CDPR algorithm (on an idea of [CGS14])

Idea

Maybe g is a somehow small element of $\langle g \rangle$


[CGS14]: P. Campbell, M. Groves, and D. Shepherd. Soliloquy: A cautionary tale.

Main idea of the CDPR algorithm (on an idea of [CGS14])

Idea

Maybe g is a somehow small element of $\langle g \rangle$

If $n = 1$: e.g. $\langle 2 \rangle \Rightarrow 2$ and -2 are the smallest elements.




Main idea of the CDPR algorithm (on an idea of [CGS14])

Idea

Maybe g is a somehow small element of $\langle g \rangle$

If $n = 1$: e.g. $\langle 2 \rangle \Rightarrow 2$ and -2 are the smallest elements.




For larger n : one of the generators is somehow small

The Log space

$\text{Log} : R \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^n$ (somehow generalising log to R)

Let $\mathbf{1} = (1, \dots, 1)$ and $H = \mathbf{1}^\perp$.



The Log space


$\text{Log} : R \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^n$ (somehow generalising log to R)

Let $\mathbf{1} = (1, \dots, 1)$ and $H = \mathbf{1}^\perp$.

Properties

$\text{Log } r = h + a\mathbf{1}$, with $h \in H$

- $a \geq 0$



The Log space


$\text{Log} : R \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^n$ (somehow generalising \log to R)

Let $\mathbf{1} = (1, \dots, 1)$ and $H = \mathbf{1}^\perp$.

Properties

$\text{Log } r = h + a\mathbf{1}$, with $h \in H$

- $a \geq 0$
- $a = 0$ iff r is a unit
- $\Lambda := \text{Log}(R^\times)$ is a lattice



The Log space


$\text{Log} : R \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^n$ (somehow generalising log to R)

Let $\mathbf{1} = (1, \dots, 1)$ and $H = \mathbf{1}^\perp$.

Properties

$\text{Log } r = h + a\mathbf{1}$, with $h \in H$

- $a \geq 0$
- $a = 0$ iff r is a unit
- $\Lambda := \text{Log}(R^\times)$ is a lattice
- $\text{Log}(r_1 \cdot r_2) = \text{Log}(r_1) + \text{Log}(r_2)$



The Log space


$\text{Log} : R \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^n$ (somehow generalising log to R)

Let $\mathbf{1} = (1, \dots, 1)$ and $H = \mathbf{1}^\perp$.

Properties


$\text{Log } r = h + a\mathbf{1}$, with $h \in H$

- $a \geq 0$
- $a = 0$ iff r is a unit
- $\Lambda := \text{Log}(R^\times)$ is a lattice
- $\text{Log}(r_1 \cdot r_2) = \text{Log}(r_1) + \text{Log}(r_2)$
- $\|r\| \simeq 2^{\|\text{Log } r\|_\infty}$




The CDPR algorithm

What does $\text{Log}\langle g \rangle$ look like?




The CDPR algorithm

What does $\text{Log}\langle g \rangle$ look like?



The CDPR algorithm


What does $\text{Log}\langle g \rangle$ look like?



The CDPR algorithm

The CDPR Algorithm:

- Find a generator g_1 of $\langle g \rangle$.
 - ▶ [BS16]: quantum time $\text{poly}(n)$
 - ▶ [BEFGK17]: classical time $2^{\tilde{O}(\sqrt{n})}$




[BS16]: J.F. Biasse, F. Song. Efficient quantum algorithms for computing class groups and solving the principal ideal problem in arbitrary degree number fields, SODA.

[BEFGK17]: J.F. Biasse, T. Espitau, P.A. Fouque, A. Gélín, P. Kirchner. Computing generator in cyclotomic integer rings, Eurocrypt.

The CDPR algorithm

The CDPR Algorithm:

- Find a generator g_1 of $\langle g \rangle$.
 - ▶ [BS16]: quantum time $\text{poly}(n)$
 - ▶ [BEFGK17]: classical time $2^{\tilde{O}(\sqrt{n})}$




[BS16]: J.F. Biasse, F. Song. Efficient quantum algorithms for computing class groups and solving the principal ideal problem in arbitrary degree number fields, SODA.

[BEFGK17]: J.F. Biasse, T. Espitau, P.A. Fouque, A. Gélín, P. Kirchner. Computing generator in cyclotomic integer rings, Eurocrypt.

The CDPR algorithm

The CDPR Algorithm:

- Find a generator g_1 of $\langle g \rangle$.
 - ▶ [BS16]: quantum time $\text{poly}(n)$
 - ▶ [BEFGK17]: classical time $2^{\tilde{O}(\sqrt{n})}$




[BS16]: J.F. Biasse, F. Song. Efficient quantum algorithms for computing class groups and solving the principal ideal problem in arbitrary degree number fields, SODA.

[BEFGK17]: J.F. Biasse, T. Espitau, P.A. Fouque, A. Gélín, P. Kirchner. Computing generator in cyclotomic integer rings, Eurocrypt.

The CDPR algorithm

The CDPR Algorithm:

- Find a generator g_1 of $\langle g \rangle$.
 - ▶ [BS16]: quantum time $\text{poly}(n)$
 - ▶ [BEFGK17]: classical time $2^{\tilde{O}(\sqrt{n})}$




[BS16]: J.F. Biasse, F. Song. Efficient quantum algorithms for computing class groups and solving the principal ideal problem in arbitrary degree number fields, SODA.

[BEFGK17]: J.F. Biasse, T. Espitau, P.A. Fouque, A. Gélín, P. Kirchner. Computing generator in cyclotomic integer rings, Eurocrypt.

The CDPR algorithm

The CDPR Algorithm:

- Find a generator g_1 of $\langle g \rangle$.
 - ▶ [BS16]: quantum time $\text{poly}(n)$
 - ▶ [BEFGK17]: classical time $2^{\tilde{O}(\sqrt{n})}$




[BS16]: J.F. Biasse, F. Song. Efficient quantum algorithms for computing class groups and solving the principal ideal problem in arbitrary degree number fields, SODA.

[BEFGK17]: J.F. Biasse, T. Espitau, P.A. Fouque, A. Gélín, P. Kirchner. Computing generator in cyclotomic integer rings, Eurocrypt.

The CDPR algorithm

The CDPR Algorithm:

- Find a generator g_1 of $\langle g \rangle$.
 - ▶ [BS16]: quantum time $\text{poly}(n)$
 - ▶ [BEFGK17]: classical time $2^{\tilde{O}(\sqrt{n})}$
- Solve CVP in Λ




[BS16]: J.F. Biasse, F. Song. Efficient quantum algorithms for computing class groups and solving the principal ideal problem in arbitrary degree number fields, SODA.

[BEFGK17]: J.F. Biasse, T. Espitau, P.A. Fouque, A. Gélín, P. Kirchner. Computing generator in cyclotomic integer rings, Eurocrypt.

The CDPR algorithm

The CDPR Algorithm:

- Find a generator g_1 of $\langle g \rangle$.
 - ▶ [BS16]: quantum time $\text{poly}(n)$
 - ▶ [BEFGK17]: classical time $2^{\tilde{O}(\sqrt{n})}$
- Solve CVP in Λ




[BS16]: J.F. Biasse, F. Song. Efficient quantum algorithms for computing class groups and solving the principal ideal problem in arbitrary degree number fields, SODA.

[BEFGK17]: J.F. Biasse, T. Espitau, P.A. Fouque, A. Gélín, P. Kirchner. Computing generator in cyclotomic integer rings, Eurocrypt.

The CDPR algorithm

The CDPR Algorithm:

- Find a generator g_1 of $\langle g \rangle$.
 - ▶ [BS16]: quantum time $\text{poly}(n)$
 - ▶ [BEFGK17]: classical time $2^{\tilde{O}(\sqrt{n})}$
- Solve CVP in Λ
 - ▶ Good basis of Λ
 - \Rightarrow CVP in poly time
 - $\Rightarrow \|h\| \leq \tilde{O}(\sqrt{n})$




[BS16]: J.F. Biase, F. Song. Efficient quantum algorithms for computing class groups and solving the principal ideal problem in arbitrary degree number fields, SODA.

[BEFGK17]: J.F. Biase, T. Espitau, P.A. Fouque, A. Gélín, P. Kirchner. Computing generator in cyclotomic integer rings, Eurocrypt.

The CDPR algorithm

The CDPR Algorithm:

- Find a generator g_1 of $\langle g \rangle$.
 - ▶ [BS16]: quantum time $\text{poly}(n)$
 - ▶ [BEFGK17]: classical time $2^{\tilde{O}(\sqrt{n})}$
- Solve CVP in Λ
 - ▶ Good basis of Λ
 - \Rightarrow CVP in poly time
 - $\Rightarrow \|h\| \leq \tilde{O}(\sqrt{n})$



$$\|ug_1\| \leq 2^{\tilde{O}(\sqrt{n})} \cdot \lambda_1$$


[BS16]: J.F. Biasse, F. Song. Efficient quantum algorithms for computing class groups and solving the principal ideal problem in arbitrary degree number fields, SODA.

[BEFGK17]: J.F. Biasse, T. Espitau, P.A. Fouque, A. Gélín, P. Kirchner. Computing generator in cyclotomic integer rings, Eurocrypt.

The CDPR algorithm

The CDPR Algorithm:

- Find a generator g_1 of $\langle g \rangle$.
 - ▶ [BS16]: quantum time $\text{poly}(n)$
 - ▶ [BEFGK17]: classical time $2^{\tilde{O}(\sqrt{n})}$
- Solve CVP in Λ
 - ▶ Good basis of Λ
 - \Rightarrow CVP in poly time
 - $\Rightarrow \|h\| \leq \tilde{O}(\sqrt{n})$



$$\|ug_1\| \leq 2^{\tilde{O}(\sqrt{n})} \cdot \lambda_1$$


[BS16]: J.F. Biasse, F. Song. Efficient quantum algorithms for computing class groups and solving the principal ideal problem in arbitrary degree number fields, SODA.

[BEFGK17]: J.F. Biasse, T. Espitau, P.A. Fouque, A. Gélín, P. Kirchner. Computing generator in cyclotomic integer rings, Eurocrypt.


Outline of the talk

- 1 Definitions and objective
- 2 The CDPR algorithm
- 3 This work**
- 4 Extensions and conclusion


Idea



Idea




Idea



Important

$\text{Log } r = h + a\mathbf{1}$ with a small (and $h \in H$).


Idea



Important

$\text{Log } r = h + a\mathbf{1}$ with a small (and $h \in H$).


Idea



Important

$\text{Log } r = h + a\mathbf{1}$ with a small (and $h \in H$).


Idea



Important

$\text{Log } r = h + a\mathbf{1}$ with a small (and $h \in H$).

Idea



Important

$\text{Log } r = h + a\mathbf{1}$ with a small (and $h \in H$).

Algorithm

Algorithm

Compute r_1, \dots, r_n with small ' a '

Algorithm

Compute r_1, \dots, r_n with small 'a'

Compute $\Lambda \cup \bigcup_i (h_{\text{Log } r_i} + \Lambda) \Rightarrow \text{lattice } L$

Algorithm

Compute r_1, \dots, r_n with small 'a'

Compute $\Lambda \cup \bigcup_i (h_{\text{Log } r_i} + \Lambda) \Rightarrow$ lattice L

Compute g_1 a generator of $\langle g \rangle$, let $t = h_{\text{Log}(g_1)}$

Algorithm

Compute r_1, \dots, r_n with small 'a'

Compute $\Lambda \cup \bigcup_i (h_{\text{Log } r_i} + \Lambda) \Rightarrow$ lattice L

Compute g_1 a generator of $\langle g \rangle$, let $t = h_{\text{Log}(g_1)}$

Solve CVP in L with target t (for some $\alpha \in [0, 1]$)
 \Rightarrow get a vector $s \in L$ such that $\|s - t\| \leq \tilde{O}(n^\alpha)$

Algorithm

Compute r_1, \dots, r_n with small 'a'

Compute $\Lambda \cup \bigcup_i (h_{\text{Log } r_i} + \Lambda) \Rightarrow$ lattice L

Compute g_1 a generator of $\langle g \rangle$, let $t = h_{\text{Log}(g_1)}$

Solve CVP in L with target t (for some $\alpha \in [0, 1]$)
 \Rightarrow get a vector $s \in L$ such that $\|s - t\| \leq \tilde{O}(n^\alpha)$

Write $s = h_{\text{Log } r}$ for some $r \in R$

Algorithm

Compute r_1, \dots, r_n with small 'a'

Compute $\Lambda \cup \bigcup_i (h_{\text{Log } r_i} + \Lambda) \Rightarrow$ lattice L

Compute g_1 a generator of $\langle g \rangle$, let $t = h_{\text{Log}(g_1)}$

Solve CVP in L with target t (for some $\alpha \in [0, 1]$)
 \Rightarrow get a vector $s \in L$ such that $\|s - t\| \leq \tilde{O}(n^\alpha)$

Write $s = h_{\text{Log } r}$ for some $r \in R$

$$\|rg_1\| \leq 2^{\tilde{O}(n^\alpha)} \cdot \lambda_1$$

Algorithm

Compute r_1, \dots, r_n with small 'a'

$$\text{poly}(n) / 2^{\tilde{O}(\sqrt{n})}$$

Compute $\Lambda \cup \bigcup_i (h_{\text{Log } r_i} + \Lambda) \Rightarrow$ lattice L

Compute g_1 a generator of $\langle g \rangle$, let $t = h_{\text{Log}(g_1)}$

$$\text{poly}(n) / 2^{\tilde{O}(\sqrt{n})}$$

Solve CVP in L with target t (for some $\alpha \in [0, 1]$)
 \Rightarrow get a vector $s \in L$ such that $\|s - t\| \leq \tilde{O}(n^\alpha)$

Write $s = h_{\text{Log } r}$ for some $r \in R$

$$\|rg_1\| \leq 2^{\tilde{O}(n^\alpha)} \cdot \lambda_1$$

Algorithm

Compute r_1, \dots, r_n with small 'a'

$$\text{poly}(n) / 2^{\tilde{O}(\sqrt{n})}$$

Compute $\Lambda \cup \bigcup_i (h_{\text{Log } r_i} + \Lambda) \Rightarrow$ lattice L

$$\text{poly}(n)$$

Compute g_1 a generator of $\langle g \rangle$, let $t = h_{\text{Log}(g_1)}$

$$\text{poly}(n) / 2^{\tilde{O}(\sqrt{n})}$$

Solve CVP in L with target t (for some $\alpha \in [0, 1]$)
 \Rightarrow get a vector $s \in L$ such that $\|s - t\| \leq \tilde{O}(n^\alpha)$

Write $s = h_{\text{Log } r}$ for some $r \in R$

$$\text{poly}(n)$$

$$\|rg_1\| \leq 2^{\tilde{O}(n^\alpha)} \cdot \lambda_1$$

Algorithm

Compute r_1, \dots, r_n with small 'a' $\text{poly}(n) / 2^{\tilde{O}(\sqrt{n})}$

Compute $\Lambda \cup \bigcup_i (h_{\text{Log } r_i} + \Lambda) \Rightarrow$ lattice L $\text{poly}(n)$

Compute g_1 a generator of $\langle g \rangle$, let $t = h_{\text{Log}(g_1)}$ $\text{poly}(n) / 2^{\tilde{O}(\sqrt{n})}$

Solve CVP in L with target t (for some $\alpha \in [0, 1]$) ?
 \Rightarrow get a vector $s \in L$ such that $\|s - t\| \leq \tilde{O}(n^\alpha)$

Write $s = h_{\text{Log } r}$ for some $r \in R$ $\text{poly}(n)$

$$\|rg_1\| \leq 2^{\tilde{O}(n^\alpha)} \cdot \lambda_1$$

How to solve CVP in L ?

CDPR	This work
Good basis of Λ	No good basis of L known

How to solve CVP in L ?

CDPR	This work
Good basis of Λ	No good basis of L known

Key observation

$L = \Lambda \cup \bigcup_i (h_{L \log r_i} + \Lambda)$ does not depend on $\langle g \rangle$

How to solve CVP in L ?

CDPR	This work
Good basis of Λ	No good basis of L known

Key observation

$L = \Lambda \cup \bigcup_i (h_{L \log r_i} + \Lambda)$ does not depend on $\langle g \rangle \Rightarrow$ Pre-processing on L

How to solve CVP in L ?

CDPR	This work
Good basis of Λ	No good basis of L known


Key observation

$L = \Lambda \cup \bigcup_i (h_{L \log r_i} + \Lambda)$ does not depend on $\langle g \rangle \Rightarrow$ Pre-processing on L

- [Laa16]:
- Find $s \in L$ such that $\|s - t\| = \tilde{O}(n^\alpha)$
 - Time:
 - ▶ $2^{\tilde{O}(n^{1-2\alpha})}$ (query)
 - ▶ $+ 2^{O(n)}$ (pre-processing)

Conclusion

Approximation	Query time	Pre-processing
$2^{\tilde{O}(n^\alpha)}$	$2^{\tilde{O}(n^{1-2\alpha})} + (\text{poly}(n) \text{ or } 2^{\tilde{O}(\sqrt{n})})$	$2^{O(n)}$



+ $2^{O(n)}$ Pre-processing / Non-uniform algorithm

Outline of the talk

- 1 Definitions and objective
- 2 The CDPR algorithm
- 3 This work
- 4 Extensions and conclusion

Extensions


We can extend the algorithm to

- Non principal ideals

Extensions

We can extend the algorithm to

- Non principal ideals
- Other number fields



Extension to any ideal

Ideal

An ideal is $I = \{ar_1 + br_2, r_1, r_2 \in R\}$ for some $a, b \in R$

A principal ideal is $\langle g \rangle = \{gr, r \in R\}$ for some $g \in R$.

Extension to any ideal

Ideal

An ideal is $I = \{ar_1 + br_2, r_1, r_2 \in R\}$ for some $a, b \in R$

A principal ideal is $\langle g \rangle = \{gr, r \in R\}$ for some $g \in R$.

[CDPR]: find the smallest generator of a principal ideal


Extension to any ideal

Ideal

An ideal is $I = \{ar_1 + br_2, r_1, r_2 \in R\}$ for some $a, b \in R$

A principal ideal is $\langle g \rangle = \{gr, r \in R\}$ for some $g \in R$.

[CDPR]: find the smallest generator of a principal ideal




Extension to any ideal

Ideal

An ideal is $I = \{ar_1 + br_2, r_1, r_2 \in R\}$ for some $a, b \in R$

A principal ideal is $\langle g \rangle = \{gr, r \in R\}$ for some $g \in R$.

[CDPR]: find the smallest generator of a principal ideal



What we did

- All generators • are somehow large


Extension to any ideal

Ideal

An ideal is $I = \{ar_1 + br_2, r_1, r_2 \in R\}$ for some $a, b \in R$

A principal ideal is $\langle g \rangle = \{gr, r \in R\}$ for some $g \in R$.

[CDPR]: find the smallest generator of a principal ideal



What we did

- All generators \bullet are somehow large
- Multiply by some small r
 - ▶ $\langle rg \rangle$ sublattice of $\langle g \rangle$


Extension to any ideal

Ideal

An ideal is $I = \{ar_1 + br_2, r_1, r_2 \in R\}$ for some $a, b \in R$

A principal ideal is $\langle g \rangle = \{gr, r \in R\}$ for some $g \in R$.

[CDPR]: find the smallest generator of a principal ideal



What we did

- All generators \bullet are somehow large
- Multiply by some small r
 - ▶ $\langle rg \rangle$ sublattice of $\langle g \rangle$
 - ▶ not much smaller


Extension to any ideal

Ideal

An ideal is $I = \{ar_1 + br_2, r_1, r_2 \in R\}$ for some $a, b \in R$

A principal ideal is $\langle g \rangle = \{gr, r \in R\}$ for some $g \in R$.

[CDPR]: find the smallest generator of a principal ideal



What we did

- All generators \bullet are somehow large
- Multiply by some small r
 - ▶ $\langle rg \rangle$ sublattice of $\langle g \rangle$
 - ▶ not much smaller
 - ▶ with a small generator \bullet


Extension to any ideal

Ideal

An ideal is $I = \{ar_1 + br_2, r_1, r_2 \in R\}$ for some $a, b \in R$

A principal ideal is $\langle g \rangle = \{gr, r \in R\}$ for some $g \in R$.

[CDPR]: find the smallest generator of a principal ideal



Extension to any ideal

- I has no generator (not principal)
- Multiply by some small ideal J
 - ▶ IJ sublattice of I
 - ▶ not much smaller
 - ▶ principal
 - ▶ with a small generator •

- Approx-SVP in ideal lattices might be easier than in general lattices

Impact

- Approx-SVP in ideal lattices might be easier than in general lattices
- No concrete impact/attack against crypto schemes
 - ▶ exponential pre-processing

Impact

- Approx-SVP in ideal lattices might be easier than in general lattices
- No concrete impact/attack against crypto schemes
 - ▶ exponential pre-processing
 - ▶ almost no schemes based in ideal-SVP




Impact

- Approx-SVP in ideal lattices might be easier than in general lattices
- No concrete impact/attack against crypto schemes
 - ▶ exponential pre-processing
 - ▶ almost no schemes based in ideal-SVP



Impact

- Approx-SVP in ideal lattices might be easier than in general lattices
- No concrete impact/attack against crypto schemes
 - ▶ exponential pre-processing
 - ▶ almost no schemes based in ideal-SVP



Perspectives and open questions

- Remove/test the heuristics
- Improving the algorithm for specific rings?
- Generalize to module SVP?

Perspectives and open questions

- Remove/test the heuristics
- Improving the algorithm for specific rings?
- Generalize to module SVP?

Questions?