

Probabilistic Applicative Bisimulation and Call-by-Value Lambda Calculi

Joint work with Ugo Dal Lago

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Introduction

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- **Context equivalence** [Morris1968] :
 - Two terms M and N are context equivalent if their **observable behavior** is the same in **any** context.
 - Proving that two programs are **not** equivalent is relatively easy: just find **a** context that separates them.
 - Proving that two program are indeed **equivalent**, on the other hand, can be quite complicated.
- Other equivalence notion : Bisimilarity

Our result

For a probabilistic λ -calculus (Λ_{\oplus}) :

Context Equivalence = Bisimilarity

- 1 Λ_{\oplus}
 - Syntax and Operational Semantics
 - Motivating Example : Perfect Security
- 2 Bisimulation
 - Probabilistic Bisimulation in the abstract
 - A Labelled Markov Chain for Λ_{\oplus}
 - Example
- 3 Context Equivalence vs. Bisimulation
 - $\sim \subseteq \equiv$
 - Full Abstraction
- 4 Conclusions

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- **Approximation (Big-Step) Semantics:**
 - $M \Downarrow \mathcal{D}$, where $\mathcal{D} : \text{Values} \rightarrow [0, 1]$ sub-probability distribution.
 - Approximation from below : only finite distributions

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \frac{}{M \Downarrow \emptyset} \quad \frac{}{V \Downarrow \{V^1\}} \quad \frac{M \Downarrow \mathcal{D} \quad N \Downarrow \mathcal{E}}{M \oplus N \Downarrow \frac{1}{2}\mathcal{D} + \frac{1}{2}\mathcal{E}} \\
 \\
 \frac{M \Downarrow \mathcal{H} \quad N \Downarrow \mathcal{F} \quad \{P[V/x] \Downarrow \mathcal{E}_{P,V}\}_{\lambda x.P \in \mathcal{H}, V \in \mathcal{F}}}{MN \Downarrow \sum_{V \in \mathcal{F}} \mathcal{F}(V) \left(\sum_{\lambda x.P \in \mathcal{H}} \mathcal{H}(\lambda x.P) \mathcal{E}_{P,V} \right)}
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- **Semantics:** $\llbracket M \rrbracket = \sup_{M \Downarrow \mathcal{D}} \mathcal{D};$
- Variations: **Small-Step Semantics, Call-by-name Evaluation.**

Why Probabilistic Computation?

An Example: Perfect Security



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Let $\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2)$ be an **adversary**.

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  return  $b = b'$ .
```

An Example: Perfect Security

For every adversary \mathcal{A} ,

$$Pr(\text{PrivK}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\Pi} = \text{true}) = \frac{1}{2}$$

An Example: Perfect Security

One-Time-Pad

$GEN = \underline{\text{true}} \oplus \underline{\text{false}} : \mathbf{bool};$

$ENC = \lambda x. \lambda y. \text{if } x \text{ then } (\text{NOT } y) \text{ else } y : \mathbf{bool} \rightarrow \mathbf{bool} \rightarrow \mathbf{bool};$

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The Experiment as a Pair of Terms

$$EXP_{FST} = \lambda x. \lambda y. ENC \ x \ GEN : \mathbf{bool} \rightarrow \mathbf{bool} \rightarrow \mathbf{bool};$$
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
$$\forall \mathcal{A}. Pr(\text{PrivK}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{OTP}} = \text{true}) = \frac{1}{2} \Leftrightarrow EXP_{FST} \equiv EXP_{SND}$$

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Bisimilarity (deterministic case)

Let (S, Act, \rightarrow) be a LTS (Labelled Transition System).

- A Simulation is a relation R on S such that : If $p R q$, and $p \xrightarrow{a} s$, there exists t such that $q \xrightarrow{a} t$ and $s R t$.




- Bisimilarity : p and q are bisimilar if : $p R q$, and R is a bisimulation.

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Applicative Bisimulation [Abramsky93]

Terms

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Terms

Values

M

N

L

\vdots

Applicative Bisimulation [Abramsky93]

Terms	Values
M	V
N	W
L	Z
\vdots	\vdots

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
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
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
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
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- **Similarity:** union of all simulations, denoted \preceq ;
- **Bisimilarity:** union of all bisimulations, denoted \sim .

Theorem

$M \equiv N$ iff $M \sim N$.


Probabilistic Bisimulation in the Abstract [LS1992]

Labelled Markov Chain (LMC): a triple $\mathcal{M} = (\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{L}, \mathcal{P})$, where

- \mathcal{S} is a countable set of *states*;
- \mathcal{L} is a set of *labels*;
- \mathcal{P} is a *transition probability matrix*, i.e., a function $\mathcal{P} : \mathcal{S} \times \mathcal{L} \times \mathcal{S} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ such that for every state s and for every label l , $\mathcal{P}(s, l, t) = \sum_{t \in \mathcal{S}} \mathcal{P}(s, l, t) \leq 1$;

Bisimilarity (probabilistic case)

Let $(S, \mathcal{L}, \mathcal{P})$ be a LMC (Labelled Markov Chain).



Bisimulation : R such that

- R equivalence relation on S .
- $(p, q) \in R \Rightarrow$ for every equivalence class E , $a \in \mathcal{L}$,

$$\sum_{s \in E} \mathcal{P}(p, a, s) = \sum_{s \in E} \mathcal{P}(q, a, s)$$

.

A Labelled Markov Chain for Λ_{\oplus}

Terms


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
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$$N\{W/x\} \xleftarrow{W, 1} \lambda x.N$$

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$$\mathcal{R}_{\sigma} = X_{\sigma} \cup ID_{\sigma};$$

$$X_{\mathbf{bool}} = \{(ENC \underline{\mathit{true}} GEN), (ENC \underline{\mathit{false}} GEN)\};$$

$$X_{\mathbf{bool} \rightarrow \mathbf{bool}} = \{(\lambda y.ENC y GEN), (\lambda y.ENC \underline{\mathit{true}} GEN),$$
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Context Equivalence vs. Bisimulation

- **Contexts:**

$$C ::= [\cdot] \mid \lambda x.C \mid CM \mid MC \mid M \oplus C \mid C \oplus M.$$

- **Context Equivalence:** $M \equiv N$ iff for every context C it holds that $\Sigma[C[M]] = \Sigma[C[N]]$.

Theorem

\sim is included in \equiv .

Lemma

\sim is a congruence.

- $M \sim N \implies C[M] \sim C[N]$
- Howe's technique.

Full Abstraction?

- \sim is a **sound** methodology for program equivalence.
- Is it also **complete**?
- **CBN : No** [DLSA2014]
 - Counterexample:

$$M = \lambda x. \lambda y. (\Omega \oplus I); \quad N = \lambda x. (\lambda y. \Omega) \oplus (\lambda y. I).$$

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- **CBV**
 - The counterexample above cannot be easily adapted.
 - Contexts seem to be more powerful.

Full Abstraction in CBV

- **Tests:** $t ::= \omega \mid a \cdot t \mid \langle t, t \rangle$.
- **Semantics of Tests**

$$P_{\mathcal{M}}(x, \omega) = 1; \quad P_{\mathcal{M}}(x, a \cdot t) = \sum_{s \in \mathcal{S}} \mathcal{P}(x, a, s) \cdot P_{\mathcal{M}}(s, t)$$

$$P_{\mathcal{M}}(x, \langle t, s \rangle) = P_{\mathcal{M}}(x, t) \cdot P_{\mathcal{M}}(x, s).$$

Theorem (vBMMW2004)

$x \sim y$ iff for every test t it holds that $P_{\mathcal{M}}(x, t) = P_{\mathcal{M}}(y, t)$.

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- But the question now is: are contexts powerful enough to implement every possible test?

Full Abstraction in CBV

- Contexts do **not** have the necessary discriminating power in **CBN**.
 - Conjecture: only tests in the form $\langle t_1, \dots, t_n \rangle$ where each t_i is a *trace* can be captured.
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- **Lemma.** For every test t there is a context C_t which is equivalent to t in CBV.
- **Theorem.** In CBV, \sim and \equiv coincide.

How About Simulation (in CBV)?

- Similarity can itself be characterized by a notion of testing, but for a **stronger** notion of test.
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- Let us look at the counterexample for CBN:

$$M = \lambda x. \lambda y. (\Omega \oplus I); \quad N = \lambda x. (\lambda y. \Omega) \oplus (\lambda y. I).$$

- The two terms are incomparable by \approx .
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- But how about context equivalence?
- **Lemma.** $M \leq N$.
- **Proof.** Purely operational.

Our Neighborhood

- Λ , where we observe **convergence**

	$\sim \subseteq \equiv$	$\equiv \subseteq \sim$	$\approx \subseteq \leq$	$\leq \subseteq \approx$
<i>CBN</i>	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>CBV</i>	✓	✓	✓	✓

[Abramsky1990,Howe1993]

- Λ_{\oplus} with nondeterministic semantics, where we observe **convergence**, in its **may** or **must** flavors.

	$\sim \subseteq \equiv$	$\equiv \subseteq \sim$	$\approx \subseteq \leq$	$\leq \subseteq \approx$
<i>CBN</i>	✓	✗	✓	✗
<i>CBV</i>	✓	✗	✓	✗

[Ong1993,Lassen1998]

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Conclusions

- Summing up:

	$\sim \subseteq \equiv$	$\equiv \subseteq \sim$	$\approx \subseteq \leq$	$\leq \subseteq \approx$
<i>CBN</i>	✓	✗	✓	✗
<i>CBV</i>	✓	✓	✓	✗

- Further work:


- What if we add **sequencing** to CBN?
- What if we add **parallel or** to CBN?
- How about **approximate** notions of bisimulation?
- How about λ -calculi for probabilistic polynomial time?

Questions?


Howe's Technique

 \mathcal{R} \mathcal{R}^H


Howe's Technique




Howe's Technique



Howe's Technique



Howe's Technique



Howe's Technique

$$\frac{\bar{x} \vdash x \mathcal{R} M}{\bar{x} \vdash x \mathcal{R}^H M} \quad \frac{\bar{x} \cup \{x\} \vdash M \mathcal{R}^H L \quad \bar{x} \vdash \lambda x. L \mathcal{R} N \quad x \notin \bar{x}}{\bar{x} \vdash \lambda x. M \mathcal{R}^H N}$$

$$\frac{\bar{x} \vdash M \mathcal{R}^H P \quad \bar{x} \vdash N \mathcal{R}^H T \quad \bar{x} \vdash (PT) \mathcal{R} L}{\bar{x} \vdash MN \mathcal{R}^H L}$$

$$\frac{\bar{x} \vdash M \mathcal{R}^H P \quad \bar{x} \vdash N \mathcal{R}^H T \quad \bar{x} \vdash (P \oplus T) \mathcal{R} L}{\bar{x} \vdash M \oplus N \mathcal{R}^H L}$$

The Key Lemma

- Proving that \approx^H is indeed a precongruence is a convenient way to proceed.
- **Statement:** If $M \approx^H N$, then for every $X \subseteq \Lambda_{\oplus}(x)$ it holds that $\llbracket M \rrbracket(\lambda x.X) \leq \llbracket N \rrbracket(\lambda x.(\approx^H(X)))$.
- **Proof.**
 - We prove that $\mathcal{D}(\lambda x.X) \leq \llbracket N \rrbracket(\lambda x.(\approx^H(X)))$ for every \mathcal{D} such that $M \Downarrow \mathcal{D}$.
 - By induction on the structure of any derivation of $M \Downarrow \mathcal{D}$ (which is finite).
 - Everything goes through smoothly, except... the application case.
 - We need to prove that probability assignments can always be *disentangled*. This is the case, though.

- So we have :

$$\begin{aligned}
 \sim^H \cup \sim &\Longrightarrow \sim^H = \sim \\
 &\Longrightarrow \sim \text{ is a precongruence} \\
 &\Longrightarrow \sim \text{ is a congruence} \\
 &\Longrightarrow \sim \cup \equiv .
 \end{aligned}$$

Theorem

$$\sim \cup \equiv$$