The 'Unexpectedness' of Ducoup

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1. Introduction

Ducoup is a consequenced discourse marker (DM), analogous to donc, alors, de ce fait, de suite, de ce moment, etc. Hence it is expec-
tant.

1.1 Topic of the talk: (i) the notion of Duexpectances is unclear; (ii) one can
agree in (Rossari and Jayez 2000: Rj).

1.2 Other observations don't support this view.

1.2.1 Contra-observations

2. The puzzle of Ducoup

2.1 Contrasted observations

1. Some observations suggest that Ducoup is odd when the right segment
denotes a stable property (i. level property in Carlson's (1977) terms). Cf.

(1) a. C'est le fils d'Alain Delon, Ducoup il est beau.

'His father is Alain Delon, Ducoup he is handsome'

b. Jean fait un mètre quatre-vingt, Ducoup il est grand.

'John is six feet tall, Ducoup he is tall'

2. However, other observations don't support this view.

(1) a. C'est le fils d'Alain Delon, Ducoup il est beau.

'C'est le fils d'Alain Delon, Ducoup il est beau.

b. Jean fait un mètre quatre-vingt, Ducoup il est grand.

'Jean fait un mètre quatre-vingt, Ducoup il est grand.

3. Other examples suggest that Ducoup is appropriate when the right segment
denotes a change in state.

(3) jean fait un mètre quatre-vingt, Ducoup il est plus grand que son frère.

'When John reached the height of 6 feet, he became taller than his brother.'

4. However, other observations don't support this view.

(4) jean fait un mètre quatre-vingt, Ducoup il est daltonien.

'John is colour-blind, Ducoup he is colour-blind.'

2.2 Rj's proposal

1. Rj proposes that Ducoup is sensitive to the fact that the proposition on
the right is not a translatable.

2. Predictions—Examples of type 1 are explained by the fact that there is
no special reason why the right proposition (being handsome or tall) should be omitted.

3. Other examples suggest that Ducoup is insensitive to the fact that the
right proposition is understood to be false when the left segment
transitional. Examples of types 3 are explained by the fact that there is no
special reason why the right proposition (being handsome or tall) should be omitted.

Exemples de types 3 sont expliqués par le fait qu'il n'y a pas de raison
particulière pour que la proposition de droite (étant beau ou grand) n'ait pas été
omise.

2. However, other observations don't support this view.

(1) a. C'est le fils d'Alain Delon, Ducoup il est beau.

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1. The representation

1.1 The usefulness associated with

1.2 The formulation of

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2. Problems with the proposal

2.1 Technical problems: the notion of 'normally' omitted is fundamentally unclear (see next section). The formulation of the transitionalscript remains vague.

2.2 Empirical problems: the possibility of 2 remains unexplained. If it is not expected that John is handsome or tall, why should it be expected that he is at ease in basketball? His being good at basketball is no more/less predictable than his being handsome or tall.

In addition, ducoup does not signal that a conclusion is blocked in the context. In a schema \( \phi \boxdot \psi \), \( \psi \) can be already expected given other information.

3. Expectation and transitionality

3.1 It is well-known that many DMs are sensitive to conditionalexpectation: other things being equal, certain information \( \phi \) can increase or lower the expectation w.r.t. \( \psi \). See Lakoff's (1971) treatment of, but similar proposals in (Jayez & Rossari 1999) and (Merin 1999).

3.2 RJ uses the notion of omission formulated in the language of info. states (Stalnaker 1978, Veltman 1996).

An information state \( s \) is a set of possible worlds (\( s \subseteq W \)). When a proposition \( \phi \) holds at every point of \( s \), it is said to be accepted in \( s \); when a proposition \( \phi \) holds at every point of \( s \), it is said to be omitted in \( s \). When a transition \( \phi \boxdot \psi \) holds, \( \psi \) can be already expected given other information.

3.3 The problem with RJ's approach is that they connect omission and expectation by requiring that the omission of some proposition be expected or 'normal'.

3.4 What is the 'effect' of \( \phi \)? The measure of the expectation of \( \phi \) in isolation, and the expectation \( E' \) of \( \phi \) given \( \psi \), the measure of the difference between \( E \) and \( E' \) represents the 'effect' of \( \phi \).

4. The representation

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then, the worlds in which John is saved by Paul but is not hit by a truck are

\[
e = \text{John died,}
\]

Subsequently, a truck hit John,

\[
e' = \text{Paul saved John's life,}
\]

The examples are improved when "= John died, " = Paul saved John's life." All transitionalexamples have a similar structure.

causes such that, at John's location, Gary is older than his brother.

The property of being taller is non-circumstantial:

If John is tall and takes advantage of that whenever he plays basketball,

then the sentence "John being tall causes John taking advantage of that at every location where John plays basketball, in particular at the location John being tall causes John taking advantage of that" is accepted at any state.

The existential acceptance formulas become expressions of the hybrid logic.

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1. These examples are anomalous because the second condition is violated.

2. If John is tall and takes advantage of that, then he is necessarily taller than his brother. Distinction between denoting at a transitionalevent and denoting a particular event.

3. If John is tall and takes advantage of that whenever he plays basketball, then the sentence "John being tall causes John taking advantage of that at every location where John plays basketball, in particular at the location John being tall causes John taking advantage of that" is accepted at any state.

4. Two conditions for causation have problemstodistinguish between a cause and an effect.

5. Treatments proposed for causation have problemstodistinguish between a cause and an effect.

6. Remarks

A first-orderlanguage of eventualities is accepted at any state.

In such epistemic cases, the acceptance formulas become expressions of the hybrid logic.

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...moresimilar to the actual world than the worlds where John is not saved, dies and is of course not hit by a truck. We can suppress "(the because of "e") more easily.

In the following example, suffering from hayfever causes each individual to have headache but Dowty's test tells us also that the hayfever is the cause of the (more abstract) event 'having frequent headaches'.

(13) Jean John souffre du rhume des foins, hayfever, *ducoup* DM il he a has souvent mal' `at`ete frequent headaches

One might argue that having frequent headaches is not confined to some particular location(s) and that, in this respect, *ducoup* should be blocked.

However, the event of having frequent headaches emerges from quantifying over individual events (headaches). In fact, 10 entails 14.

(14) P *ducoup* P' is appropriate whenever P describes the cause of an event which results from quantifying over particular events which are each caused by e.

5. Conclusion

I have been noted by French linguists that the word *coup* denotes something like a sudden event (probably because of its Greek origin). See the expressions *sur le coup* (at first), *tout `a coup*, *d'un seul coup* (also as sudden, at once).

In *ducoup*, this trace is partially lost since the noun can appear in -long- and -long-. In the noun *mauvais coup* (bad luck), *le coup* expresses the adverb meaning (predominantly because of the Greek origin). See the expressions *la mauvaise foi* (false faith)...

References


