

Martin J. Osborne, Co-editor

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Dr. Pierre Lescanne
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Dear Dr. Lescanne,

Thank you for submitting your paper “Feasibility/Desirability Games for Normal Form Games, Choice Models and Evolutionary Games” to *Theoretical Economics*.

I have read the paper. My reaction is very similar to my reaction to your previous submission, “A discrete Nash Theorem with quadratic complexity and dynamic equilibria” (joint with Le Roux and Vestergaard). What does the analysis of FD games add to our understanding of strategic interaction?

You start with an example (“A quest for the wonderland”) that you say is a strategic situation not representable as a strategic game. You don’t explain what the example models. It appears to involve two independent decision makers, with different options and preferences. The strategic interaction between the decision makers is unclear.

Your results, Propositions 1 and 2, do nothing to show that your model is interesting. I hesitate to use the word “trivial”, but as far as I can see the results follow by very simple arguments.

So the paper has to be judged on the interest of the idea. Like the referees of your previous submission, I can’t see why it is interesting. To convince us, at a minimum you need an economically interesting example that shows how your new formalism can capture interesting features of strategic interaction that the model of a strategic game cannot. What significant real world phenomenon cannot be captured in a strategic game but can be captured in an equilibrium of a FD game? That is, you need to argue that your model can “explain” observed behavior that cannot be explained by the standard model. An example of boats in search of “wonderland” may be useful to explain your model (though in fact I cannot see how it is), but a necessary (but not sufficient!) condition to convince us that your ideas are valuable is an example related to important real world behavior.

The bottom line is that I am rejecting your paper for publication in TE.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'M. Osborne', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Martin J. Osborne