

## Analysis of critical control systems: combining formal analyses

Michael Dierkes joint work with Rémi Delmas, Pierre Roux, Romain Jobredeaux, Adrien Champion, and Pierre-Loïc Garoche

September 23rd 2013 – FMICS

# TYPICAL DEVELOPMENT CYCLE OF A CONTROLLER

Differential Equations (plant)


Control theorists

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→ Continuous controller

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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- \* frequency domain proof argument vs state space domain (ie. Lyapunov functions)

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


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



- Fault tolerance: set of constructs to recover from system/hardware failures
  - \* is this architecture sound (ie. when there is less than  $n$  simultaneous error, the output is still valid or there will still be a working controller)

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


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
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
Control theorists  
Computer scientists

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
Safety architecture  $\rightsquigarrow$  Test Simulation  
redundancy, validators, COM/MON...



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
### Code

#### ■ Actual implementation:

- \* floats not reals
- \* pointers, arrays, memory access → potential failure
- \* real world: overflows



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## VERIFICATION METHODS USED IN THE INDUSTRY

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- static analysis of the code/model: compute an abstract representation of reachable state, mainly focuses on numerical accuracy, or data structure topology and manipulation (null pointers access, arrays, ...)


# RUNNING EXAMPLE

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
System to be controlled:



## RUNNING EXAMPLE

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Controller itself:






# RUNNING EXAMPLE

## SIMPLE YET HARD TO ANALYZE CONTROLLER FOR A MASS-SPRING DAMPER

Fault tolerance architecture:



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Stable linear controllers with or without saturations are analyzed using a specific abstract domain:

1. The control flow graph of the controller is identified
2. The stability of each linear subsystem is analyzed and provides a quadratic Lyapunov function (ellipsoid)
3. The set of reachable states is bounded using the generated ellipsoids.



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
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
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- do not give good results in presence of complex numerical computations

## COMBINING ANALYSES




## BASIC SATURATIONS




Abstract Interpretation computes a sound bound (1.2) on each output whatever the value of  $in_{xy}$  is.

## ANALYSIS OF THE TRIPLEX VOTER



Backward analysis applied on each triplex proves the specification BIBO.


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$$\forall k \in \mathbb{N}, |InA_k| \leq a \wedge |InB_k| \leq a \wedge |InC_k| \leq a \implies |Output_k| \leq 3a \wedge |EqualizationA_k| \leq 2a \wedge |EqualizationB_k| \leq 2a \wedge |lyauEqualizationC_k| \leq 2a$$

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


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
Assuming input is bounded by 1.2, we have output bounded by 3.6.

## ANALYSIS OF THE CONTROLLER



Providing a bound on the inputs (3.6) an over-approximation of the output is computed:

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


Providing a bound on the inputs (3.6) an over-approximation of the output is computed:  $|u| \leq 194.499$ .

$$0.098 x_3^2 - 0.224 x_3 x_2 + 0.040 x_3 x_1 - 0.026 x_3 x_0 + 0.141 x_2^2 - 0.053 x_2 x_1 \\ + 0.030 x_2 x_0 + 0.024 x_1^2 - 0.017 x_1 x_0 + 0.019 x_0^2 \leq 14.259$$




## REBUILDING THE ANALYSIS




$] - \infty, +\infty[$

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


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
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System is bounded!

## CONCLUSION

Successful approach to analyze representative example  
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Good results on simple usecase. Currently addressing the analysis of industry-level FADEC (collab. with industrial partners) and academic yet representative examples of aircraft controllers (collab. with Polytech Montréal, Georgia Tech and NASA).