

# Analysis of Boolean functions

We consider functions of iid Bernoulli  $(\frac{1}{2})$  random variables  $f(x_1, \dots, x_n)$

By CLT, & we will also derive results about functions of iid  $N(0,1)$  variables.

It is more convenient to use  $\{-1, 1\}$  instead of  $\{0, 1\}$ .

So we look at functions  $f: \{-1, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{-1, 1\}$  (Boolean function)  
 or  $\{-1, 1\}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ .

## • Fourier-Walsh expansion

Any Boolean function is a multilinear polynomial.

Ex  $\max_2: \{-1, 1\}^2 \rightarrow \{-1, 1\}$        $\max_2(x_1, x_2) = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2}x_1 + \frac{1}{2}x_2 - \frac{1}{2}x_1x_2$

$\text{maj}_3: \{-1, 1\}^3 \rightarrow \{-1, 1\}$        $\text{maj}_3(x_1, x_2, x_3) = \frac{1}{2}x_1 + \frac{1}{2}x_2 + \frac{1}{2}x_3 - \frac{1}{2}(x_1x_2x_3)$

This notation for  $SC(n)$  define  $\sigma \in \mathcal{P}$  for  $x = (x_i) \in \{-1, 1\}^n$   
 $x^\sigma = \prod_{i \in S} x_i$  (WALSH functions)  $w_\sigma(x) = x^\sigma$

Theorem Any  $f: \{-1, 1\}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  can be uniquely expressed as a multilinear polynomial

$$f(x) = \sum_{S \subseteq [n]} \hat{f}(S) x^S$$

$$f = \sum_{S \subseteq [n]} \hat{f}(S) w_S$$

↑  
WALSH-FOURIER  
coefficients of  $f$ .

Proof  $f(x) = \sum_{y \in \{-1, 1\}^n} f(y) \prod_{i \in [n]} \chi_i(x)$

and  $\prod_{i \in [n]} \chi_i(x) = \left(\frac{1+x_1}{2}\right) \dots \left(\frac{1+x_n}{2}\right)$

so the result follows; uniqueness by dimension counting

Consider the space  $L^2(\{-1,1\}^n, \mathbb{P})$   
uniform probability measure

Theorem  $(w_S)_{S \subseteq [n]}$  is an orthonormal basis

Proof  $E[w_S w_T] = E \prod_{i \in S} x_i \prod_{j \in T} x_j = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } S=T \\ 0 & \text{by independence if } S \neq T. \end{cases}$   
 $(x_i)$  iid unbiased random bits

OR:  $w_S w_T = w_{S \Delta T}$  and  $E w_S = \begin{cases} 0 & S \neq \emptyset \\ 1 & S = \emptyset \end{cases}$

Proposition  $\forall f: \{-1,1\}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$   
 $\hat{f}(S) = E[f w_S]$

PARSEVAL formula  $E[f^2] = \sum_{S \subseteq [n]} \hat{f}(S)^2$

We have  $\hat{f}(\emptyset) = E f$ . therefore:

$$\text{Var}(f) = \sum_{\substack{S \subseteq [n] \\ S \neq \emptyset}} \hat{f}(S)^2$$

Social choice BOOLEAN functions  $f: \{-1,1\}^n \rightarrow [-1,1]$

can be interpreted as social choice functions, such that

- majority (well defined if  $n$  is odd)
- dictatorship, antidictatorship
- iterated majority

The  $i^{\text{th}}$  influence of a  $\mathbb{F}_2$  BOOLEAN function  $f: \{-1, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{-1, 1\}$  (3)

$$I_i(f) = \mathbb{P}(f(x) \neq f(x^{\oplus i}))$$

$$\text{where } x^{\oplus i} = (x_1, \dots, x_{i-1}, -x_i, x_{i+1}, \dots, x_n)$$

We also have

$$I_i(f) = \mathbb{E}_{x \in \{-1, 1\}^n} \text{Dif}(x)^2$$

$$\text{where } \text{Dif}(x) = \frac{f(x^{(i \rightarrow 1)}) - f(x^{(i \rightarrow -1)})}{2}$$

and this definition makes sense for any function  $\{-1, 1\}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ , not necessarily BOOLEAN.

The operation  $D_i$  is a discrete derivation operator

$$\text{If } f = \sum_{S \subseteq [n]} \hat{f}(S) w_S \text{ then } D_i f = \sum_{\substack{S \subseteq [n] \\ i \in S}} \hat{f}(S) w_{S \setminus \{i\}}$$

$$\text{Indeed } D_i w_S(x) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } i \notin S \\ w_{S \setminus \{i\}} & \text{if } i \in S \end{cases}$$

PARSEVAL's identity implies that

$$I_i(f) = \|D_i f\|_2^2 = \sum_{S \ni i} \hat{f}(S)^2$$

~~and~~  $I_i f$

the total influence of a function is

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$$\text{Inf } f = \sum_i \text{Inf}(f_i)$$

and we have therefore  $\text{Inf}(f) = \sum_c \sum_{S \ni c} \hat{f}(s)^2$

$$\text{so } \text{Inf}(f) = \sum_s |S| \hat{f}(s)^2.$$

In particular

Poincaré inequality

$$\text{Var}(f) \leq \text{Inf}(f)$$

Corollary, ~~There is~~ For every function  $f: \{-1, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{-1, 1\}$   
then  $\exists c$  s.t.  $\text{Inf}_c f \geq \frac{1}{n} \text{Var}(f)$

(If  $\mathbb{E}f = 0$  then  $\text{Var}(f) = 1$  since  $\mathbb{E}f^2 = 1$ ).

Example majority  $\text{Inf}_i f = O\left(\frac{1}{n}\right) \quad \forall i$

is dictatorship  $\text{Inf}_{c_0} f = 1 \quad \text{Inf}_i f = 0$  if  $i \neq c_0$ .

More sophisticated example: "tribes"

split  $[n]$  into  $p$  groups (tribes) of size  $k$ , and  
let  $f = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if unanimity for } 1 \text{ in at least one group} \\ -1 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$

$$\text{IP}(f = -1) = \left(1 - \frac{1}{2^k}\right)^p$$

If we set  $k$  and  $p$  such that  $\left(1 - \frac{1}{2^k}\right)^p \approx \frac{1}{2}$

More sophisticated example: tribes

We describe a function  $f: \{-1, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{-1, 1\}$  as a voting system

Assume  $n = k2^k$  and split  $[n]$  into  $2^k$  groups (tribes) of size  $k$ .

Define  $f$  by  $f = 1$  if there is a tribe ~~with~~ ~~with~~ with unanimity for 1

$f = -1$  otherwise

$$P(f = -1) = \left(1 - \frac{1}{2^k}\right)^{2^k} \approx \frac{1}{e} \quad \text{so } \text{Var}(f) \approx 1 - \left(1 - \frac{2}{e}\right)^2$$

$$E f = \left(1 - \frac{1}{e}\right) - \frac{1}{e} = 1 - \frac{2}{e}$$

$\text{Inf}_i f$  does not depend on  $i$  and equals

$$\text{Inf}_i f = \left(1 - \frac{1}{2^k}\right)^{2^{k-1}} \cdot \frac{1}{2^{k-1}} \sim \frac{c}{2^k} \sim \frac{c \log n}{n}$$

This  $\log n$  is sharp

Theorem (Kahn-Kalai-Linial)

$$\forall f: \{-1, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{-1, 1\} \\ \exists i \text{ s.t. } \text{Inf}_i f \geq \frac{c \log n}{n} \text{Var}(f)$$

discrete analogue of OI law.

We will prove this next time using hypercontractivity

The Poincaré inequality can be seen as an isoperimetric inequality on the discrete cube  $\{-1, 1\}^n$  equipped with Hamming distance  $d(x, y) = \#\{i: x_i \neq y_i\}$ .

Let  $A \subset \{-1, 1\}^n$  and  $f = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{on } A \\ -1 & \text{on } \bar{A} \end{cases} \quad \alpha = \frac{|A|}{2^n}$

$$E f = \alpha - (1 - \alpha) = 2\alpha - 1 \quad \text{and} \quad \text{Var} f = 1 - (1 - 2\alpha)^2 = 4\alpha(1 - \alpha)$$

$$\text{Inf}_i f = \# \text{ edges adjacent to } A$$



## Noise operator

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For  $\epsilon \in [0, 1]$

For  $x \in [-1, 1]^n$ , we write  $y \sim N_\epsilon(x)$  to denote a random string chosen as follows:  $\forall i \in [n]$ , independently,

$$y_i = \begin{cases} x_i & \text{proba } \epsilon \\ \text{uniform at random} & \text{proba } 1-\epsilon \end{cases} \quad \mathbb{E}[y_i] = \epsilon x_i$$

Equivalently  $y_i = \begin{cases} x_i & \text{proba } \frac{1+\epsilon}{2} \\ -x_i & \text{proba } \frac{1-\epsilon}{2} \end{cases}$  and this makes sense for  $\epsilon \in [-1, 1]$ .

We say that  $y \Rightarrow x$  is  $\epsilon$ -correlated to  $x$

We say that  $(x, y)$  is a  $\epsilon$ -correlated pair if

$x$  is uniform on  $[-1, 1]^n$

$y$  is  $\epsilon$ -correlated to  $x$

$\Leftrightarrow (y, x)$   $\epsilon$ -correlated

( $\Leftrightarrow \mathbb{E}[x_i] = \mathbb{E}[y_i] = 0 \quad \mathbb{E}[x_i y_i] = \epsilon \quad + \text{independence between indices}$ )

The Noise stability of  $f$  is

$$\text{Stab}_\epsilon[f] = \mathbb{E}_{\substack{(x, y) \\ \epsilon\text{-correlated}}} [f(x) f(y)].$$

Theorem

For  $f: [-1, 1]^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$

$$\text{Stab}_\epsilon[f] = \sum_{S \subseteq [n]} \epsilon^{|S|} \hat{f}(S)^2$$

Proof

$$\text{Stab}_\epsilon[f] = \mathbb{E}[f \circ T_\epsilon f] \quad \text{with} \quad T_\epsilon f(x) = \mathbb{E}_{y \sim N_\epsilon(x)} f(y)$$

$$T_\epsilon w_S = \epsilon^{|S|} w_S \quad \text{since} \quad T_\epsilon w_S(x) = \mathbb{E}_{y \sim N_\epsilon(x)} \prod_{i \in S} y_i \\ = \epsilon^{|S|} \prod_{i \in S} x_i$$

$T_e$  is the majority operator

$$T_e f = \#_{y \in M_e(x)} f(y)$$

### Aggregation Arrow's theorem

Consider non-binary social choice

E.g. an election with candidates A, B, C

Each voter has its preference list

A > B > C  
 A > C > B  
 B > A > C  
 B > C > A  
 C > A > B  
 C > B > A

Consider  $f: \{-1, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{-1, 1\}$

A candidate A is a Condorcet winner if  $f$  if

$$f\left(\left(\prod_{A>B \text{ for } i\text{-th voter}}\right)\right) = 1$$

$$f\left(\left(\prod_{A>C}\right)\right) = 1$$

Condorcet paradox:  $f = \text{Maj}$  may not have a Condorcet winner

Theorem: If  $f: \{-1, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{-1, 1\}$  is a social choice function which always produces a Condorcet winner, then  $f = \text{dictatorship}$  or  $f = \text{antidictatorship}$

Proof Suppose voters randomly choose their preference list

let  $x = (x_i)$   $x_i = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } i\text{th voter says } A > B \\ -1 & \text{if } A < B \end{cases}$

$y = (y_i)$   $y_i = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } B > C \\ -1 & \text{if } B < C \end{cases}$

$z = (z_i)$   $z_i = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } C > A \\ -1 & \text{if } C < A \end{cases}$

~~Each~~  $x, y, z$  are iid on  $\{-1, 1\}^n$ , but not independent

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$$E[X_i Y_i] = \frac{2-4}{6} = -\frac{1}{3}$$

So  $X$  and  $Y$  are  $\rho$ -correlated for  $\rho = -\frac{1}{3}$ .

Consider the function  $\text{MAE} : [-1, 1]^3 \rightarrow [-1, 1]$  "not all equal"

$$\text{MAE}(w_1, w_2, w_3) = \begin{cases} -1 & \text{if } w_1 = w_2 = w_3 \\ 1 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$\text{MAE}(w_1, w_2, w_3) = \frac{3}{4} - \frac{1}{4} w_1 w_2 - \frac{1}{4} w_1 w_3 - \frac{1}{4} w_2 w_3$$

By assumption  $E[\text{MAE}(X, Y, Z)] = 1$

~~$$E[\text{MAE}(X, Y, Z)] = 1$$~~

$$E[\text{MAE}(f(X), f(Y), f(Z))] = 1$$

$$\text{So } \frac{3}{4} - \frac{3}{4} \text{Sh}_\rho(f) = 1$$

$\Leftrightarrow$

$$\text{Sh}_\rho(f) = -\frac{1}{3}$$

$$\sum_{S \subseteq [n]} \left(-\frac{1}{3}\right)^{|S|} f(S)$$

Since  $f\left(-\frac{1}{3}\right)^k \geq -\frac{1}{3} \quad \forall k \in \mathbb{N}$

This is only possible if  $f$  is a linear function

$$f(S) = 0 \quad \text{if } |S| \neq 1$$

So  $f = \sum_{i=1}^n \alpha_i w_{\{i\}}$  ; since  $f$  takes values in  $[-1, 1]$  it is only possible if  $f = \pm w_{\{i\}}$