




Towards a Dependable Architecture for Highly Available Services

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




- **Current Fault Tolerance framework's deficiencies & constraints**
- An end-to-end highly available framework
- The FT-FW architecture
- **The Active Replication Architecture**
- Conclusion & Future work



Current FT Frameworks Deficiencies & Constraints






Firewalls and Stateful Devices Requirements

Sernel level and application level states require to be properly replicated and correctly spawned in case of failure of a legitimate device

- Reactivity to failure
- Transparency
- Simplicity
- Low Cost
- Efficiency




An end-to-end Highly Available Architecture





FT-FW Architecture &



- Event driven architecture
- CTS: Connection Tracking
 System tracks connections and store states, we extended it
 with a framework to inject
 states and to receive state
 change events.
- SP: State proxy, replication
 daemon which interact with
 CTS. It stores two caches.

FT-FW Replication Protocol *S*

- The SP is composed of two parts, the sender and the receiver, the main ideas of the replication protocol are:
 - > The **sender** never stops sending messages
 - The receiver handles all messages (even those that are out of sequence).
- The protocol reduces the number of retransmitted messages in case of message omission.








Experiments


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Evaluating FT-FW: The Design Space *&*




- **C** Machine specs:
- HP Proliant 145g2, AMD
 Opteron2.2GHz, 1
 GEthernet.
- conntrack-tools: free
 software (GPL) user-space
 daemon which implements
 the SP.





Evaluating FT-FW: Commit Time &


Commit time: Time required to inject the states stored in the external cache into the CTS. 25000 states in 250 milliseconds.





Evaluating FT-FW: Replication Cost

- CPU consumption during replication (1 TCP connection means 6 state changes): ~40% for 2500 HTTP GET connections per second.
- Ping roundtrip: The solution introduces a delay of 5 milliseconds (negligible)





Discussion &

Because of its asynchronous nature,

Does not guarantee that firewall replicas are one-copy equivalences as in database replication schemas:

- Two-phase and three-phase commit protocols are heavyweight since they would introduce an unaffordable delay.

Solution:

> Flexible recovery: Recover states from precedent states (reduce security)

Initial stages of a flow, the clients usually transparently retry after a short timeout if no response is received.


- When Checkpointing states doesn't apply
 - Use the active replication concept



The concept of Active Replication $\, \& \,$

Active Replication" (AR) applied to any "stateful" device

- > Enables the failover of a session while avoiding the interruption of the ONGOING ones
- Provides the transparent replication of the kernel states (the Netfilter states, the flow states, etc.) + the application level states (the load balancer states, etc.)



AR Architecture Components \mathscr{S}

Full client/server transparency / Applies to any stateful device / No overhead is incurred to the end-to-end communications during failure free periods / Good performance during failures


Ava	ailabilit	y Monito	r
	Heartbe up Noc	at Msgs	
Ava	ailabilit	y Monito	r
Prim	ary Unav	 ailability Ale	ert
F	ailover	Handler	ŝ
	kup Mode	e Terminatio r icator	on
		chronizer Traf. Pro	
	Modifie	d Traffic	
1		terceptor, Modifier	
_ L	2126210/035	100-5310-531 Md 0/1	1



AR Implementation Details (1/2) &

The active replication based component for state replication

- Packet non intrusive interception and processing using {BPF/pcap/libnet} based user space packages
 - ICMP/UDP/TCP support
- User and kernel space module for TCP state replication
 - Netlink capabilities
 - Structure of a ct_sync msg



State consistency

- Netfilter based rules triggered at the backup startup



AR Implementation Details (2/2) &

The failure detection component

- Concept & Properties
 - Detects failures as soon as they occur
 - One error-free instance of the service is running at once
 - STONIGHT & Mon
- Implementation
 - HB based: Light customization to handle time at micro-sec granularity

The failure recovery component

- > Availability through Network level takeover
 - GRATUITOUS ARP resource takeover
- Reliability through state replication
- Disabling of the AR process
 - Interception, filtering, ARP module customizations, etc.
- Ongoing connection freezing








Experiments


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




The SIP-based VOIP Use case &







D10_00/0



State replication consistency


Generated Traffic	Traffic interception and rewriting at the Backup	Traffic rewriting cost at the Backup	Backup outgoing traffic generation
ІСМР	Correct frames (Data + Headers)	Less than the ms	Correct replies (Data + Headers)
UDP	Correct frames (Data + Headers)	Less than the ms	Correct replies (Data + Headers)
ТСР	Correct frames (Data + Headers)	Less than the ms	Correct replies (Data + Headers)



Latency incurred to the INCOMING & OUTGOING signaling traffic

Definition

> The time from when a legitimate frame is intercepted by the backup node to the time at which a copy of the same frame is delivered to the backup's kernel.





Other Failure-Free Periods Performed Tests

C Failure free periods AR cost

- Low CPU & memory usage overhead
- Service level consistency
 - Only one instance of the cluster entry is talking at a time



Failure Recovery Cost

Failure recovery effectiveness


Failure recovery latency

> Definition

- *latency* _{failure _ recovery} = *latency*_{Fault_Detection} + *latency*_{Takeover}

FDI (sec)	Average Failure Detection Latency (micro-sec)	Average Takeover Latency (micro-sec)	Average Recovery Time (micro-sec)
1	0 708 375	0 546 748	1 255 123
3	0 825 868	0 546 748	1 372 616
5	1 430 499	0 546 748	1 977 247








Failure Recovery Cost

Scalability measures

The loss ratio is intuitively


defined as the following (cps):

Loss _ Ratio = $\frac{Average _ Nber _ Failed _ Sessons}{Total _ Nber _ Active _ Sessions}$






The Experimental Setting *S* Simple TCP-based Conversation Use Case





Failure Free AR Cost

Pl. refer to slide 12 for the definition








Sernel-to-User Netlink communication delay

> The time required by the Netlink based kernel module to send back the acknowledgement to the user space application, after successfully updating the state of the fake TCP connection.








Failure Recovery Cost

Pl. refer to slide 14 for the definition



D29 - 29/02/2008

Conclusion &

We presented a "true" client/server transparent service high availability through active replication

> Recovers the ongoing and the new offered sessions

Provides

Replication of kernel level states (transport layer states, etc.) & application level states for stateful devices

C Assumes for now

- "Deterministic enough" applications
- > A "lightweight" Linux kernel 2.6.x dependency

Room for improvement

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Possible extensions &

Active/Active redundancy

> VRRP

More AR compliant applications

> AR + checkpointing (for less deterministic applications)

More large scale tests



Thanks Any Questions?

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